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Compensation is a kind of pro-social behavior that can restore a social relationship
jeopardized by interpersonal transgression. The effectiveness of a certain compensation
strategy (e.g., repaying money, sharing loss, etc.) may vary as a function of the
social norm/relationship. Previous studies have shown that two types of norms
(or relationships), monetary/exchange and social/communal, differentially characterize
people’s appraisal of and response to social exchanges. In this study, we investigated
how individual differences in preference for these norms affect individuals’ perception
of others’ as well as the selection of their own reciprocal behaviors. In a two-phase
experiment with interpersonal transgression, we asked the participant to perform a
dot-estimation task with two partners who occasionally and unintentionally inflicted
noise stimulation upon the participant (first phase). As compensation one partner
gave money to the participant 80% of the time (the monetary partner) and the
other bore the noise for the participant 80% of the time (the social partner). Results
showed that the individuals’ preference for compensation (repaying money versus
bearing noise) affected their relationship (exchange versus communal) with the partners
adopting different compensation strategies: participants tended to form communal
relationships and felt closer to the partner whose compensation strategy matched
their own preference. The participants could be differentiated into a social group,
who tended to form communal relationship with the social partner, and a monetary
group, who tended to form communal relationship with the monetary partner. In the
second phase of the experiment, when the participants became transgressors and were
asked to compensate for their transgression with money, the social group offered more
compensation to the social partners than to the monetary partners, while the monetary
group compensated less than the social group in general and showed no difference
in their offers to the monetary and social partners. These findings demonstrate that
the effectiveness of compensation varies as a function of individuals’ preference for
communal versus monetary norm and that monetary compensation alone does not heal
all wounds.
Keywords: social exchange norm, interpersonal transgression, compensation, individual differences
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Introduction
What would you do if you forgot your mother’s birthday?
You may feel guilty and make up for this by spending
more time with her (de Hooge et al., 2011). Compensation
following social/interpersonal transgression helps to restore
the threatened social relationship and reinstate social justice
(Baumeister et al., 1994). There are many forms of compensation,
such as monetary compensation and liability sharing. Diﬀerent
types of compensation are not equally eﬀective in restoring the
jeopardized relationship in all social contexts. For example, your
disappointed mother in the above example will not be happier
if you pay her for forgetting her birthday. In a similar vein, if
you break a vase in a souvenir shop, it is better to pay rather
than just make an apology (at least in some cultures). What
are the factors that inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of compensation?
This question is of great societal, political, and philosophical
signiﬁcance (Lazare, 2004), as it is crucial to important issues such
as a victim’s reception of institutional or personal compensation.
For example, what is the optimal way to compensate the survivors
of holocaust or the victims of racial discrimination? Can money
heal all wounds? If not, what might be the factors that inﬂuence
the eﬀectiveness of monetary/material compensation?
Obviously, the oﬀering and reception of compensation
involve a set of socioeconomic and psychological processes
governed by certain social norms or social relationships.
In social psychology, an inﬂuential theory that characterizes
diﬀerent norms/relationships is the monetary/exchange and
social/communal dichotomy proposed by Heyman and Ariely
(2004). They argued that the monetary norm prompts people
to be highly sensitive to the magnitude of the compensation,
balancing the debt precisely and immediately, usually in
calculable ways; in contrast, the social or communal norm
does not demand reciprocity with such urgency and precision,
but focuses more on the “soft” aspects of social interaction,
such as mutual understanding, mutual support, and long-term
relationship. As for the psychological mechanism through which
the exchange/communal rules inﬂuences people’s social behavior,
the self-signaling theory posits that an action is chosen in part
to secure good news about the inner traits or abilities one values
(Bodner and Prelec, 2003). Viewed in this way, one may choose
to reciprocate a social encounter so that such reaction could
reveal his/her committed social norms (e.g., exchange versus
communal).
The monetary/exchange versus social/communal dichotomy
captures a stable diﬀerence in individuals’ appraisal and behavior
in social interactions. Is it possible then that individuals’
preference of monetary versus communal relationship inﬂuences
how they perceive a speciﬁc form of compensation and
how they make compensations to others in interpersonal
transgression? Few study have focused on such individual
diﬀerences. Nevertheless, a hint for the answer to this question
comes from research on gift-giving, which has shown how giver’s
and recipient’s characteristics inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of gift-
giving. For instance, some gift-giving researchers explored the
eﬀect of the match between the gift and the recipient’s desire
or taste related to gift appreciation (Gino and Flynn, 2011;
Ward and Broniarczyk, 2011); other researchers explored the
eﬀect of the relationship between the giver and the recipient
and its eﬀects on gift appreciation (Belk, 1976; Ruth et al.,
1999). Recently a number of researchers also focused on how
the degree of match between a gift and the giver’s identity
inﬂuences recipients’ appreciation (Paolacci et al., 2015). To a
certain extent compensation can be viewed as a kind of ‘giving’ in
the context of interpersonal transgression. We thus hypothesize
that individuals’ preference diﬀerences for social versus monetary
norms may modulate their attitude toward the compensation
given to them as well as their own choice of compensation when
they harm others.
In this study, we tested this hypothesis by carrying out
an experiment in which participants interacted with two
partners (confederates) in a two-phase game with interpersonal
transgression and compensation. The research question we are
speciﬁcally interested in is whether and how preference in
communal versus monetary ways of social interaction inﬂuences
individuals’ social relationships and reciprocal behaviors. In the
ﬁrst phase, the participant interacted with each of the partners
in consecutive blocks. Each of these blocks consisted of several
rounds of a game in which the partner estimated the number of
dots rapidly presented on the screen. If the partner’s estimation
was correct, no punishment was delivered and the next round
began. If the partner’s estimation was incorrect, the participant
had to bear a noise stimulus that was moderately unpleasant
(for details of this task, see Yu et al., 2014). In the rounds in
which the participant had to receive the noise punishment, the
partner could choose to compensate the participant either by
allocating an amount of money to the participant or by bearing
the noise stimulus for the participant. In fact, the partners’ choice
was predetermined by the experimenters such that one partner
(the ‘social partner’) chose to bear the noise for the participant
80% of the time and the other partner (the ‘monetary partner’)
chose to allocate money 80% of the time. In the second phase, the
roles of the participant and the partners were reversed and the
participant could only compensate his/her partner by allocating
money. If the participant’s dot estimation was incorrect, the
partner received pain stimulation. In that case, the participant
could subsequently choose to allocate an amount of money from
his/her pie to the partner as compensation. We predict that
individuals who prefer their social interactions to be governed
by exchange norm may form closer relationship with and exhibit
more reciprocal behaviors toward the partner who interacts with
them under exchange norm; similarly, individuals who prefer
communal norm may feel closer to and exhibit more reciprocal
behaviors toward partners who also behave in accordance with
the communal norms.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy-seven participants participated in the experiment. Three
were excluded for failing the manipulation check, leaving 74
participants (37 females; age range: 18–26, mean age = 22.6,
SD= 1.8) in the data analysis.We only recruited participants who
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had never taken part in experiments involving social interactions
with other players. None of the participants reported any history
of chronic pain or mental disorders. They all gave informed
consent prior to the experiment. This study was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Each participant interacted with two partners (confederates) in
a two-phase interpersonal transgression game. Upon arrival the
participant ﬁrst met the two confederates (partners; onemale, one
female) and was told that they would play an interactive game
together through the intranet but in separate rooms. To increase
the verisimilitude of the interaction context, the participant and
two confederates drew a lottery to decide who underwent the dot-
estimation task ﬁrst. The two confederates were always assigned
the role to do the estimation task ﬁrst and were subsequently
guided to another testing room, leaving the participant alone in
the room with the experimenter. The participant was told that
all the three players were endowed with 500 tokens each. This
amount could increase or decrease during the interactive games,
and the ﬁnal tokens one held at the end of the game would be
exchanged for a monetary bonus after the experiment (100 tokens
amounted to ¥1, ∼ $ 0.2). The participant was told in advance
that there would be a second phase of the game and the roles of
the participant and the partners would be reversed in the second
phase.
The participant then underwent calibrations of noise-bearing
and pain stimulation. The participant received noise stimulation
as a consequence of the partner’s erroneous response in the ﬁrst
phase. The intensity of the stimulus was calibrated individually
so that it was unpleasant but bearable. Speciﬁcally, after the
participant put on the earphones, we gradually increased the
intensity of the noise stimuli until the participant reported
‘moderately unpleasant’ noise levels. This intensity was used
in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment. To keep consistent with
the paradigm of measuring the compensatory behavior from a
previous study (Yu et al., 2014), the partner received electrical
stimulation as the negative result of the participant’s erroneous
response in the second phase of the experiment. Given this,
we asked the participant to experience the pain stimulation so
that he/she would be more likely to trust our manipulation and
clearly experience diﬀerent pain levels. An intra-epidermal needle
electrode was attached to the left wrist of the participant for
cutaneous electrical stimulation (Inui et al., 2002). Participant-
speciﬁc pain threshold was calibrated and three levels of pain
stimulation were set, corresponding to 0, 4, and 8 on a 0 – 10 scale
(0: ‘no sensation at all’; 10: ‘unbearable pain’). We used aversive
physical stimulation (noise and pain) rather than monetary
loss as interpersonal harm for a number of reasons. First, we
aimed to compare the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent compensation
strategies on interpersonal relationship and reciprocal behavior.
If the interpersonal harm is monetary, it does not make much
sense to compensate in a non-monetary manner. Second, when
measuring the participants’ reciprocal/compensatory behavior, it
is important to make the harm and compensation orthogonal,
otherwise the salient fairness norm could strongly bias the
behavioral measure.
The First Phase
In the ﬁrst phase of the study (Figure 1), the participant was
told to pay attention to their partners’ behavioral pattern. The
partner’s identity was indicated by a number (i.e., Partner 1
or Partner 2), thus preventing the participant from knowing
the partner’s true identity. In each round of the game, one
partner was randomly chosen to interact with the participant. The
participant was told that this partner underwent a dot-estimation
task (Yu et al., 2014): if the partner estimated incorrectly, the
participant was administered a moderate but unpleasant noise
stimulation for 10 s. The noise stimulation was induced by
a pair of earphones linked to a computer at a ﬁxed volume
calibrated before the experiment. Before the noise delivery, the
partner could choose to compensate the participant by either
allocating 100 tokens to the participant or by bearing the noise
for the participant. The participant would avoid the noise but
not receive the 100 tokens if the partner chose to bear the
noise, or they would receive 100 tokens but bear the unpleasant
noise if the partner chose to pay money. Note that the feedback
of the performance on the dot-estimation task and partners’
choice of compensation were predetermined by a computer
program so that the partners’ accounts were always enough to
pay the 100 tokens as compensation during the game. If the
partner estimated correctly, the partner received 100 tokens as
a reward. Speciﬁcally, the partner’s choice of compensation was
predetermined so that Partner 1 chose monetary compensation
80% of the time (monetary condition) and Partner 2 chose noise-
bearing 80% of the time (social condition). Hereafter, we refer
to Partner 1 as the ‘monetary partner’ and Partner 2 as the
‘social partner’. The word ‘social’ is employed only to signify the
compensation type (i.e., bearing noise). The ﬁrst phase of the
study consisted of 60 trials (30 for each partner) and lasted for
about 15 min. Speciﬁcally, Partner 1 (the ‘monetary partner’)
estimated correctly in 15 trials (ﬁllers) and incorrectly in the
other 15 trials. In the latter trials, the monetary partner chose
monetary compensation in 12 trials and noise-bearing in three
trials. Similarly, the social partner estimated correctly in 15
trials and incorrectly in 15 trials. In contrast to the monetary
partner, the social partner chose noise-bearing in 12 trials and
monetary compensation in three trials. Note, given that the noise
stimulation was presented to the participant only sporadically,
adaptation to noise was minimal and the adverse eﬀect of the
noise stimulation was maintained over the ﬁrst phase.
After the ﬁrst phase, the participant answered questions about
the two partners’ compensation behavior. The participant was
asked whether each of the partners had a preference for the
type of compensation and what was that preference. Three
participants were discarded because they did not answer these
questions correctly. The participant’s general preference for the
two types of compensation (paying money versus bearing noise)
was measured with two questions (“to what extent you prefer
your partner compensates you with money” and “to what extent
you prefer your partner bear the noise for you”). The diﬀerence
between the preference scores (paying money minus bearing
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FIGURE 1 | The task in the first phase. Each trial began with a fixation and then a cue indicating which partner was paired with the participant for the current trial.
The participant was told that his/her partner had to quickly estimate the number of dots on the screen by pressing a corresponding button to indicate whether
his/her estimation was more or less than a number (randomly chosen from 19, 20, and 21) which appeared on the next screen. The outcome of the estimation
(correct versus incorrect) was communicated to the participant on the next screen. After a correct performance, the partner received 100 monetary tokens as a
reward and the next round began. After an incorrect performance, the participant was threatened with the possibility of receiving noise stimulation, and the partner
had the chance to choose from two compensation options: paying 100 tokens to the participant or bearing the noise for the participant. The partner’s decision was
communicated to the participant on the screen. Finally, the noise stimulation was delivered to the participant if his/her partner decided to pay money, or to his/her
partner if the partner decided to bear the noise stimulation for the participant.
noise) was used in the following analysis. The participant’s
perceived closeness (or social distance) with respect to each of the
two partners was measured with two questions (“to what extent
do you prefer your partner to be your roommate” and “to what
extent do you prefer your partner to be your friend”) adapted
from Bogardus (1933)1. The participant answered these questions
on 9-point Likert scales (1 = extremely uncharacteristic,
9= extremely characteristic). Finally, the participant’s willingness
to form an exchange relationship with each of the two partners
was measured using a questionnaire adapted from Clark and
Mills (2011). Four items that were best squared with the current
interactive context were chosen from the original 9-item scale
(Table 1; scale anchor is the same as the closeness rating). High
scores on this scale indicate a high exchange (i.e., low communal)
relationship. The questions concerning closeness and exchange
relationship were given to the participant twice: once for the
social partner and once for the monetary partner. Thus, unlike
the ordinary personality questionnaires that measure stable and
general response tendencies, here the participant had to consider
the appropriateness of the statements in relation to the two
speciﬁc partners. This may have introduced additional inter-
item variance into the ratings. Since we were mainly interested
1The questions for social distance were adapted from Bogardus (1933). In the
original work, the author asked the participants to evaluate the social distance
expressed in 60 statements, ranging from “would marry” to “would have lived
outside my country.” These were not meant to be a uniﬁed questionnaire and thus
no reliability was reported. We selected two items from these statements that we
believe were the most closely related to campus life.
TABLE 1 | Exchange Relationship Scale.
Items
(1) When I give something to another person, I generally expect something
in return.
(2) I don’t bother to keep track of benefits that I have given to others.
(3) It is best to make sure things are always kept ‘even’ between two people
in a relationship
(4) When I receive benefits from partner, I ought to repay right away.
Participants rated each item on a 9-point scale (1: extremely uncharacteristic; 9:
extremely characteristic) to describe their relationship with each partner.
in the diﬀerential scores between the social and monetary
partners, we calculated the reliability based on the diﬀerential
scores. For the two questions concerning interpersonal closeness,
the Cronbach’s α = 0.96. For the four questions concerning
exchange relationship, the Cronbach’s α = 0.68. Although the
reliability for the exchange relationship questions was not very
high2, these questions did capture important intra- (social versus
monetary partner) and inter-participant (social versus monetary
participant subgroup) variability in the exchange/communal
relationship (see Results). We admit that these survey questions
could potentially make the participants’ attitudes and behavioral
tendency toward diﬀerent partners more consciously available;
however, it is unlikely that these questions could reverse such
2The Cronbach’s α for the original questionnaire is 0.73 (Williamson and Clark,
1989).
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attitudes and tendencies. Moreover, due to the speciﬁc question
we were interested in (i.e., how the preference of communal
versus exchange way of social interaction inﬂuences social
relationship and reciprocal behavior), we were not able to balance
the sequence of our diﬀerent tasks and surveys.
The Second Phase
In the second phase of the study (Figure 2), the roles of
the participant and the partners were reversed; the participant
was informed that the partners were not aware of the role-
change until then. The participant was then told that in each
round, his/her partner had to bear a pain stimulation if he/she
(i.e., the participant) estimated incorrectly. The intensity of the
electrical stimulation for the partner was randomly chosen from
three levels (none/low/high) for each round of the game. The
level of pain stimulation delivered to the partner in that trial
was communicated to the participant. After pain delivery, the
participant decided how many monetary tokens (between 0 and
100) he/she would like to transfer to the partner as compensation.
Note, the participant could compensate the partner only by
allocating money. The participant was also told that he/she would
get 100 tokens as a reward (and the partner would not receive
pain stimulation) if he/she made a correct estimation. Thus
participant’s account was always suﬃcient to pay 100 tokens in
each round. Unbeknownst to the participant, the feedback of
the performance was predetermined. Speciﬁcally, there were 72
trials (36 for each partner) in the second phase of study. For the
interaction with each partner, there were 18 rounds in which the
participant responded correctly (ﬁllers) and 18 rounds in which
the participant responded incorrectly. For the latter rounds, there
were six rounds in which the partners had to receive high pain
stimulation, six rounds of low pain stimulation, and another six
rounds of no pain stimulation. On average, the participant could
make ¥45 (∼ $ 8; ¥40 for show-up and about ¥5 for bonus).
Before the participant left the lab, he/she answered a set of
open questions such as “What do you think about your partners?”
and “Do you have any suggestions for improving the interactive
settings?” This was to make sure that the participant was not
suspicious of our experimental setup. No participant expressed
suspicion of the experimental setup or interactive nature of the
game.
Results
The First Phase
In the ﬁrst phase of the study, the participants showed large
variability regarding with whom they preferred to form the
social versus exchange relationship. To quantify this variability,
we computed a score for exchange relationship preference by
subtracting the perceived exchange relationship value for the
social partner from that for the monetary partner. Figure 3A
illustrates the distribution of this score over participants. The
individual diﬀerences most likely resulted from the participants’
FIGURE 2 | The task in the second phase. Each trial began with a cue indicating which of the two partners had been chosen for that particular round. The next
screen presented the pain-level of the current trial (none/low/high). Then the participant performed the dot-estimation task. The outcome of the performance was
communicated to both the participant and the partner on the next screen. After a correct performance, the participant received 100 monetary tokens as a reward,
and the next round began. After an incorrect performance, the partner had to bear pain stimulation. Finally, the participant indicated the amount of monetary tokens
(out of 100) he/she would be willing to pay out of his/her own pocket to compensate the partner.
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FIGURE 3 | Individual differences in the preference of compensation and social relationship (exchange versus communal). (A) The frequency distribution
of the difference in participants’ exchange relationship value toward the monetary partner versus social partner. (B) The correlation between the difference in
exchange relationship value (the monetary partner minus social partner) and the difference in preference for the two compensation types (paying money versus
bearing noise).
preference for compensation type, as indicated by a signiﬁcant
correlation between the diﬀerence of participants’ relative
preference for each compensation type in general (paying
money minus bearing noise) and their diﬀerence in exchange
relationship value toward the monetary and social partners,
r = −0.45, p< 0.001 (Figure 3B).
Thus before we carried out further analyses, we ﬁrst
categorized the participants into two subgroups by median-
splitting the participants according to the exchange relationship
preference score. This resulted in a low-score subgroup (i.e.,
the monetary group; n = 37) who had a high exchange
relationship with the partner bearing the noise and a low
exchange relationship with the partner compensating money,
and a high-score subgroup (i.e., the social group; n = 37) who
had a high exchange relationship with the partner compensating
money and a low exchange relationship with the partner bearing
the noise.
Then we set out to test whether the individual diﬀerences in
exchange relationship value inﬂuenced the participants’ perceived
social distance (or, conversely, closeness) with each partner. We
carried out repeatedmeasures ANOVAwith subgroup (monetary
versus social) as a between-subject factor and the partner’s
compensation type (paying money versus bearing noise) as a
within-subject factor. The main eﬀect of partner’s compensation
type was signiﬁcant, F(1,72) = 36.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34.
That is, in general, the participants felt closer with the partner
who compensated by bearing the noise (6.5 ± 0.2) than with the
partner who compensated by paying money (4.0 ± 0.2). More
importantly, the interaction between participant sub-group and
partner’s compensation type was signiﬁcant, F(1,72) = 28.49,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28 (Figure 4). Speciﬁcally, for the monetary
group, the partner’s compensation types did not inﬂuence feelings
of closeness, t(36) < 1, p > 0.1; but for the social group, the
closeness with respect to the social partner was signiﬁcantly
FIGURE 4 | The closeness ratings as a function of the participant
subgroup (monetary versus social) and the partner compensation type
(monetary versus social). Larger score means closer interpersonal
relationship. Error bars indicate standard errors. The asterisks denote the
significance level of the simple effect ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
higher than that with the monetary partner, t(36) = 12.60,
p< 0.001.
The Second Phase
The second phase of the study provided us with the opportunity
to examine how participants’ own compensation behavior could
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be modulated by the relationship formed with each partner.
To this end, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA on
the monetary tokens that the participants allocated to the
partner as compensation, with participant sub-group (monetary
versus social) as a between-subject factor, and the partner’s
compensation type in the ﬁrst phase (paying money versus
bearing noise) and pain-level (none/low/high) as within-subject
factors. The three-way interaction was marginally signiﬁcant,
F(2,144) = 2.95, p = 0.056, η2p = 0.04 (Figure 5). Specially,
in the no pain condition the interaction between participant
subgroup and the partner’s compensation type was signiﬁcant,
F(1,72) = 5.47, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.07. For the monetary group,
the amount of compensation did not diﬀer between the two
partners (6.6 ± 2.8 for the monetary partner, 7.4 ± 3.5 for the
social partner), t(36) = 1.14, p > 0.1; for the social group, more
compensation was oﬀered to the social partner (22.1 ± 3.5) than
to the monetary partner (14.4 ± 2.8), t(36) = 2.70, p < 0.05.
At the low pain-level, the interaction between participant group
and the partner’s compensation type was also signiﬁcant, F(1,
72) = 10.43, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.13. For the monetary group,
the amount of compensation did not diﬀer between the two
partners (29.2 ± 3.6 for the monetary partner, 28.4 ± 4.3 for
the social partner), t(36) < 1, p > 0.1; for the social group, more
compensation was oﬀered to the social partner (48.5 ± 4.3) than
to the monetary partner (38.2 ± 3.6), t(36) = 3.49, p < 0.01.
In the high pain condition, the interaction between participant
group and the partner’s compensation type was not signiﬁcant,
F(1,72) < 1, p > 0.1. As can be seen from Figure 5, this three-
way interaction was primarily driven by the lack of diﬀerential
compensation toward the monetary and the social partner by the
social group in the high pain condition. In fact, these participants
made very high compensation (about 70 tokens out of 100) to
both partners when they knew they caused very severe harm to
the partners. If the three pain levels were collapsed, the two-
way interaction between the participant’s group and the partner’s
compensation strategy was signiﬁcant, F(1,72) = 5.93, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.08. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction
showed that for the social group, the allocation was higher to
the social partner than to the monetary partner, F(1,72) = 14.53,
p< 0.001. However, for the monetary group the allocation to the
two partners did not diﬀer, F < 1, p> 0.1.
Themain eﬀect of partner’s compensation type was signiﬁcant,
F(1,72)= 8.74, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.11. The participant compensated
more for the social partner (3.76 ± 0.27) as compared with the
monetary partner (3.32 ± 0.25). The main eﬀect of pain-level
was also signiﬁcant, F(2,144) = 148.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.67
(Figure 5). The participant compensated most for the high pain-
level (5.75 ± 0.37), less for the low pain-level (3.61 ± 0.27) and
least for the no pain level (1.26 ± 0.21). The main eﬀect of
participant group was also signiﬁcant, F(1,72) = 8.15, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.10, such that the social group compensated their partner
(4.24 ± 0.35) more than the monetary group (2.83 ± 0.35).
Discussion
Following interpersonal transgression, the transgressor may try
to restore the relationship with the victim via certain forms
FIGURE 5 | The amount of monetary compensation to the two partners as a function of the participant subgroup (monetary versus social), the
partners’ compensation strategy (paying money versus bearing pain) and pain-level (no/low/high). Error bars indicate standard errors. The upper asterisks
denote the significance level of the two-way interactions, while the lower asterisks denote the significance level of the simple effects. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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of compensation. However, diﬀerent forms of compensation
are not equally eﬀective for every individual in every social
context. Here we showed that after being harmed, some people
preferred to be compensated by money while others preferred
non-monetary compensation, such as the transgressor sharing
the harm. Moreover, the individual diﬀerences in preference for
compensation not only had an impact on the victim’s perceived
social distance toward the transgressors (participants felt closer
to the transgressor whose compensation matched the their own
preference) but also had an impact on the victim’s subsequent
reciprocal behaviors toward the transgressors. Compared with
previous investigations into guilt and compensation (e.g., de
Hooge et al., 2007, 2011; de Hooge, 2012; Yu et al., 2014), the
current study contributes two novel ﬁndings: ﬁrst, we distinguish
two types of compensation (communal versus exchange) that
are commonly used in diﬀerent social contexts as well as two
subgroups of individuals who prefer diﬀerent compensation
strategies; second, we go one step further to show how
individuals’ preference of certain way of compensation inﬂuences
their own social relationship and reciprocal behaviors.
The progress made by the current study beneﬁted from the
interpersonal paradigm adopted here and in a few previous
studies (e.g., Koban et al., 2013; Crockett et al., 2014, 2015;
Yu et al., 2014). This paradigm has the strength of putting the
participants in the social context and confronting them with
the (ostensibly) real social consequences of their performance,
choices, or decisions. The interpersonal paradigm allows us to
investigate the psychological mechanisms of social emotions,
interactions and relationships as they actually occur (rather than
being limited to the participant’s imagination). Moreover, it is
natural and convenient to include social modulations, such as
communal versus exchange norms, in the interpersonal paradigm
to broaden our understanding of the regularity underlying
complex social interactions (Schilbach, 2014). As hypothesized,
our results suggest that the participants’ preference of the manner
of social interaction (e.g., communal versus exchange) did
inﬂuence both their social relationships and reciprocal behaviors.
Monetary compensation is calculable and thus easy to
precisely balance an inﬂicted harm. The downside is that money
may readily trigger the monetary/exchange norm, which runs
the risk of further dampening the social relationship (Heyman
and Ariely, 2004; Ariely et al., 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010).
The present study conﬁrmed that money cannot repair all
transgressions—or at least not better than interpersonal forms of
compensation in certain cases. More importantly, we showed that
individual diﬀerences in the victim’s preference for the manners
of compensation inﬂuence the type of social relationships
(communal versus exchange) that the victims formed with
their former transgressors. Such individual diﬀerences were
not only predictive of the types of relationship between the
victim and the transgressor, but also inﬂuenced the victim’s
perceived social distance and subsequent reciprocal behaviors
toward the transgressor. Speciﬁcally, the victims who preferred
“social” compensation (i.e., bearing pain) tended to form more
communal (i.e., less exchange) relationships with and felt closer
to the transgressors who compensated by bearing pain. In
contrast, the victims who preferred “exchange” compensation
(i.e., paying money) did not show any diﬀerence in social distance
and prosocial behaviors toward diﬀerent transgressors.
Several mechanisms may help us understand why the
diﬀerences between the two compensation types occur mainly
in the participants who preferred social/communal norms. One
possibility is that the individual self-suﬃciency orientation
guides compensation behaviors. Self-suﬃciency is deﬁned as an
insulated state wherein people put forth eﬀort to attain personal
goals and prefer to be separate from others. Money can make
the self-suﬃciency orientation more salient (Vohs et al., 2006).
In this way, individuals who rely on monetary norms, compared
with those who rely on social norms, feel less dependent on
social connection and thus may care less about how others
treat them. Another possibility is that exchange relationship
orientation inﬂuences compensation behaviors. In light of the
communal (or exchange) relationship theory, the individuals
who have high exchange relationship orientation always keep
precise balance in their social interactions (Mills and Clark,
1982). Equal and immediate return in the helping behavior draws
clear boundary between the self and others, which decreases
interpersonal risk but means less connections and less willingness
to keep long-term relationships with others (Roberts, 2004).
Thus, both self-suﬃciency orientation and exchange relationship
orientation reﬂect an individual’s need for independence from
others, and a feeling of dependence may render an individual
more sensitive to diﬀerent types of interpersonal relationships
or compensation strategies (Doi, 2014). In contrast, individuals
who commit to exchange/monetary norms have a higher self-
suﬃciency orientation and exchange relationship orientation
when compared with the social group, making them less likely
to care about interpersonal information/intention conveyed
through the partner’s compensation strategy.
As compensatory behaviors are mainly driven by emotions
such as guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994; Ketelaar and Au, 2003;
Yu et al., 2014), the guilty feeling and intention for restoring
relationship inherent in the compensation behaviors (paying
money or bearing noise) may aﬀect individuals from the social
group more than individuals from the monetary group. In our
study, bearing harm for others may convey more empathy or
care for partner’s pain compared with paying money. Thus
bearing harm exhibited a more consolatory eﬀect than money
for individuals from the social group, making them compensate
more points to their partners (McCullough et al., 2014). These
results suggest that individuals who are inclined to adhere to
the social/communal norm are more sensitive to diﬀerent types
of interpersonal relationships or compensation strategies than
individuals adhering to the monetary/exchange norm.
Additionally, our studies showed that the social norm
motivated the individuals from the social group through
a strategy of matching. Speciﬁcally, when the oﬀender’s
compensation strategy (e.g., bearing harm) was consistent with
the relationship type of the individuals from the social group (i.e.,
communal relationship), the individuals from the social group
experienced more closeness with the oﬀender and exhibited more
compensatory behaviors in the subsequent role-reversed task
than the oﬀender who had compensated by paying money (i.e.,
the unmatched condition). What is the underlying mechanism
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for this matching process? A possible explanation appeals to
the individuals’ self-veriﬁcation motivation (Swann et al., 1989,
1994). This account proposes that people prefer to be seen in the
same way as they see themselves. This motivation may incline
individuals to prefer to be treated in the same way in which
they treat others. Thus paying money to individuals from the
social group may pose a conﬂict with those individuals’ self-
veriﬁcation motivations. This conﬂict may weaken the restoring
eﬀect of compensation. This explanation is line with the recent
research on gift-giving that the matching between giver’s and
the recipient’s characteristics can increase the eﬀectiveness of
gift-giving (Kube et al., 2012; Paolacci et al., 2015).
However, we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant incentive eﬀect of
money on individuals from the monetary group, which may
have resulted from the small amount of money used in the
current study. One-hundred points of tokens roughly amounted
to $ 0.2, which may not be attractive enough to motivate
these individuals. It has been shown that the intensity of the
reinforcement plays a key role in determining the eﬀectiveness
of the reinforcers on social behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Future study should match
the subjective values of the two types of compensation (paying
money versus bearing noise). Another limitation of the current
study is that we did not directly measure guilt in the second
phase of the task. It is still an open and important question as
to whether the communal/exchange relationship formed with
diﬀerent partners can inﬂuence one’s feelings of guilt toward the
partners and whether such feeling can account for the diﬀerence
in reciprocal/compensatory behavior.
In summary, we demonstrated that the eﬀectiveness of
compensation varies as a function of the individual diﬀerences
in preferences for communal versus exchange modes of social
interaction. The preference for a certain type of compensation
(e.g., paying money versus bearing noise) also inﬂuences the
interpersonal relationships formed between the recipient and
the provider of the compensation: monetary compensation acts
to undermine the perceived closeness with the recipient who
weights communal norms more than exchange norms toward the
provider of the compensation. These ﬁndings have implications
for both institutional and interpersonal consolatory actions: for
severe damage to social relationship, trust, cooperation and
the like, material compensation alone may not be enough
to heal the wounds, and may even make things worse (e.g.,
decreasing interpersonal closeness and reciprocal behaviors). In
that case, a sincere apology or other authentic and creative social
compensation strategies may be better ways of repairing the
threatened interpersonal relationship.
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